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The issues surrounding climate change continue to have polarizing effects on many 
Americans. In this thesis I offer a potential bridge to this divide with a comprehensive 
study on how issue frames can impact how individuals shape their opinions on 
environmental issues. Focusing on a national security frame, I ask the central research 
“Will the public perceive issues of climate change differently when they are framed as 
threats to national security?”  For this thesis I design an original experimental survey to 
measure the impact security framing has on participants’ perception of both climate 
change and environmental policy options. The survey was designed using Qualtrics 
online survey software and I recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
crowd-sourced labor platform. I use data from this original framing experiment to show 
that exposure to a national security frame does, indeed, affect perceptions on 
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As the debate over climate change continues to divide Americans, primarily along 
partisan lines, media messaging and the framing strategies used may be partially 
responsible for this division. After rebranding “global warming” to the more 
comprehensive term of “climate change,” advocates on both sides of the climate change 
debate have used varying policy frames to define the narrative environmental problems, 
or the lack of problems, to align with policies that further their political agendas. One 
frame that seems to be gaining steam among policy actors and the media is to portray the 
dire effects of climate change as an issue of national security. Environmental advocates 
and military leaders are in near agreement that disaster-mitigating policies are necessary 
for the protection of both national and international security. Placing a security frame on 
issues related to climate change has been a strategy used in the highest level of American 
government. What was once a pillar of the Obama administration’s National Security 
Strategy, the Trump administration omitted climate change as a threat to national security 
when they issued their first National Security Strategy in January 2017.1 This shift in the 
executive-level framing of climate change provides numerous research opportunities to 
                                                          
1 For the Obama Administration National Security Strategy see: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf, 




examine how the framing of climate change issues by media outlets, politicians, and 
interest groups affect public perceptions. Does the public perceive issues of climate 
change as more severe when they are framed as threats to national security?  Does public 
support government action on climate change increase when policy options are framed as 
necessities for maintaining national security? These two questions, together, comprise the 
central research question this thesis seeks to address. 
To answer these questions, I design an original framing experiment that randomly 
assigns a large N, crowdsourced sample to read one of two news excerpts prior to 
answering questions related to climate change, national security, and policy. The 
treatment excerpt frames climate change as an issue of national security, while the control 
excerpt contains no framing, outside of the original article from which the excerpt is 
taken. The literature reviewed in this thesis provides a strong theoretical foundation to 
build predictions on the likely results this experiment may report.  
Issues surrounding climate change have been contentious and publicly polarizing 
since they first landed on the public agenda (Dunlap and McCright 2011). The 
mobilization of both environmental advocacy groups and corporate interests (McCright 
and Dunlap 2000) and coordinated efforts in casting blame when an environmental 
disaster occurs (Merry 2014) have been successful strategies in rallying support bases and 
shaping public opinions of climate change. However, these efforts are likely adding to an 
already hyper-polarized issue. This thesis seeks a possible bridge to this divide by 
offering research on a frame that may reduce the polarizing effects of climate change. If 
the participants of this study react positively to the security frame, they may be more 
likely to change their perception of climate change as a matter of national security. 
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Moreover, if the security frame changes perceptions of climate change it may have the 
additional effect of increasing action on policy options.  
The layout of this thesis is designed to provide a comprehensive coverage of the 
relevant social science literature, the experimental design and methods used for data 
collection, and how the data were analyzed. Chapter II reviews the relevant social science 
literature, such as policy issue framing and problem definition theory, media choice, 
environmental and national security public opinion, and public policy agenda setting. I 
discuss how each area of research builds a theoretical foundation for this thesis. Chapter 
III provides a brief overview of public opinion on environmental issues captured in the 
2016 American National Election Study (ANES). A series a data tables examine views on 
environmental issues from respondents across the political spectrum. Chapter IV outlines 
the research design and method and measurement this thesis deploys to test the 
hypotheses introduced in this chapter. The use of a survey experiment, the digital survey 
software Qualtrics, and Amazon’s online labor force for recruiting survey participants 
(“MTURK”) are also examined. Chapter V presents a series of statistical models that test 
the effects of the framing experiment on a large N, randomly assigned sample. This thesis 
concludes with a final chapter, Chapter VI, that discusses the implications of this study 






This chapter provides a review of the literature used to develop the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. First, I discuss the theory of issue framing and its effects on 
influencing individual attitudes. Next, I examine research on the attitudes on 
environmental policies and the factors that contribute to these attitudes. Similar to the 
review on environmental policies, I then examine literature on attitudes toward national 
security with a particular emphasis on the public’s attitude of importance in security 
issues. I then review recent research showing the connection between environmental 
issues and national security. Finally, I review policy agenda setting literature with an 
emphasis on policy framing and narratives. Following this review, I formally state and 
justify my primary hypotheses. 
Issue Framing Theory 
Issue frames are both common and essential communications strategies that 
organize everyday reality into succinct narratives (Tuchman 1978). Recent research into 
the effects of media issue framing on individual attitudes has focused on the ways in 
which the media play a role in the construction of reality (McQuail 1994; Scheufele 
1999). In a time where information consumers have seemingly endless amounts of media 
outlets to choose from, media is becoming increasingly tailored to fit an individual’s 
political ideology and social preferences, often without the consumer’s knowledge 
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(Drotner, 2005). The public can now consume media that is only relevant to them and 
ignore what is not. This combination of the media’s ability to construct reality and 
personalized news and information sources leads individuals toward a reality that is built 
not just on personal experiences and interactions with peers, but on their interpretations 
of the media they have consumed (Drotner, 2005; Keeter, 1993; Scheufele, 1999).  
Media outlets, politicians and advocacy groups are at an advantage when they 
frame stories in a way that garners a lot of public attention. These policy actors often 
focus on high-stakes issues, as they are believed to be the most newsworthy, all of which 
leads to increased viewership and exposure (Bennett, 1996; Boydston & Glazier, 2013; 
Gans 2004). This leads media outlets to frame stories in a more negative or loss frame 
than a positive or gain frame and thus sensationalizing the story (Boydston & Glazier, 
2013; Sheafer, 2007). This practice represents the media strategy of “if it bleeds, it leads” 
when deciding on which stories to run. In addition to loss versus gain media framing, 
media outlets have seen increase viewership when stories are framed in such a way that 
plays off an individual’s fear (Boydston & Glazier, 2013; Gans, 2004; 
Iyengar, 1991, 1996). 
Additional research on media and public opinion has shown that news headlines 
alone can have a powerful effect on the attitudes people adopt on issues by providing 
cognitive shortcuts, or heuristics, (Allport & Lepkin, 1943; Geer & Kahn, 1993; Pfau, 
1995; Smith & Fowler, 1982; Tannenbaum,1953) even when there is considerable 
dissonance between the headline and its corresponding story (Andrew, 2007). I utilize 
these findings in the design of the survey experiment by providing the treatment group 
with a national security frame in the headline, as well as the body. 
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This research on media and the strategic use of issue frames builds the position of 
this thesis that a national security frame on climate change will affect the public’s 
perception on climate change’s impacts. Obviously, issues of national security rank fairly 
high in sensationalism, making such a frame advantageous for media outlets, politicians, 
and issue advocacy groups.  Furthermore, for an issue to be immune to the barriers 
established with personalized media sources and crowd-sourced social media, issues will 
likely have to take on frames that invoke fear or play off other national anxieties. A 
national security frame on climate change may produce such an effect. 
Environmental Attitudes and Media Frames 
Media communications specific to environmental policies are often framed as 
achievement of gains or avoidance of losses; individuals can make radical choices when 
they are presented with the opposing frame (Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; Gifford & 
Comeau, 2011; Reber & Berger, 2005). In particular, media frames that suggest the 
achievement of a high level of gains predict an increase in support for environmental 
policies (Bertolotti & Catellani, 2014; Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall, & Bretschneider, 
2011). It is my intention to frame environmental policy in this same manner, of gains vs 
losses, but with the added focus on national security implications.  
Additional research suggests that conservatives are, in general, less concerned 
about the environment and are less likely to support pro-environment policies than liberal 
leaning individuals (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap & McCright, 2000, 2011; McCright, 
Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). However, this lack of environmental concern is more 
particular to American conservatives than their international conservatives (McCright, 
Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). Conservatives in other Western countries such as the 
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UK, Canada, and Australia have historically lacked similar negative views on climate 
change (Brechin, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2008). In America, generally the most consistent 
predictors of environmental support are political ideology and party identification 
(Konisky, Milyo, & Richardson, 2008). Additionally, research shows that pro-
environmental populations such as the young, racial minorities, and the well-educated, 
are not typically associated with the Republican Party or conservative ideology, whereas 
more religious individuals tend to be less supportive (Carman, 1998; Guth, Green, 
Kellstedt, & Smidt, 1995; Kanagy, Humphrey, & Firebaugh, 1994; Klineberg, McKeever 
& Rothenbach, 1998; Konisky el al, 2008; Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Xiao & Dunlap 
2007). This research suggests that the framing experiment employed in this thesis may 
have profound effects across political ideology, especially if the frame is able to raise 
support among populations where it traditionally lacks. Chapter III goes a bit further in 
explaining the political polarization surrounding environmental issues by presenting 
political descriptive statistics on environmental support.  
While a security frame has yet to be tested, the use of different media frames 
when discussing environmental issues have had varying results. Frames that are expected 
to be responsive to conservatives, such as religious morality and economic efficiency, 
have not been shown to affect a change in support for environmental issues (Severson 
and Coleman, 2015). Through the process of this review, I have yet to find any 
experiments that test the effects of a national security frame on environmental 
perceptions, therefore this research will contribute to theory on media framing and 
attitudes on the environment. A significant change in the perception of climate change 
among traditionally conservative demographics would represent a large impact of the 
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security frame, because these are the groups that may be the most skeptical in terms of 
the environment. 
National Security Framing and Public Opinion 
 Research into the importance that national security implications have on voter 
attitudes has shown a steady increase in support for policies that mitigate the risks of a 
negative national security impact. Globalization, international uncertainty and greater 
interconnectedness give national security issues a greater importance in the minds of 
voters more so now than in the past (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 1989; 
Brooks, Dodson, & Hotchkiss, 2010; Smith, 1996). Moreover, individuals tend to rally 
around politicians, and their policies, in times where the risks of adverse effects to 
national security are high (Brooks et al 2010; Mueller 1970). For example, in the 2008 
general election, national security issues relating to defense spending, terrorism, and the 
Iraq war had a substantial influence on voting behavior (Brooks et al 2010). In general, 
conservative individuals tend to assign greater importance in national security issues and 
conservative politicians and media outlets are more likely to emphasize stories with a 
strong frame of national security (Konisky et al, 2008). This conservative focus on 
national security suggests such a frame on climate change may affect their perceptions on 
the issues. 
 As previously noted, media outlets have an economic advantage in producing 
news stories that focus on negative frames that invoke fear in the consumer. Framing 
news stories in terms of national security provides politicians greater access to the media, 
and thus to voters; as media outlets are more inclined to report such stories (Brooks, et al 
2010). Based on this increased focus on national security and the preferential treatment 
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given by media outlets, I can reasonably expect that when framing environmental issues 
in terms of the adverse risk to national security, the public will be more supportive of the 
mitigating policies. However, there must first be a clear link between pro-environmental 
policies and reducing the risk of negative national security issues.  
Environment as National Security 
Viewing environmental policies in terms of national security is a relatively new 
practice for researchers, politicians, the media and the public. It was not until the late 
20th century that researchers began to examine the potential for environmentally 
escalated violence and the greater possibility of international conflicts such as resource 
wars over oil, natural gas, water, etc. (Gleick, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Matthew, 
2000). By the early twenty-first century, the magnitude and implications of human-
generated environmental change have had significant influences on the theory and 
practice of national security (Matthew, 2000). Scholars and national security experts have 
since been drawing a clearer connection between environment and security. Research has 
found that environmental degradation poses a direct threat to national security, putting 
lives, national welfare and emergency preparedness in danger (Levy, 1995). By drawing 
this clear connection in the media frames on environmental policy, this thesis expects to 
find that participants in my survey experiment on the effects of framing will rely on this 
connection, or heuristic, when determining their attitudes of such policies, leading to 
increased attention on the policy agenda. 
Issue Frames in Agenda Setting 
 Another key objective of this project was to examine the policy implications of 
issue framing. If framing theory suggests frames can affect individual’s perception of 
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reality, theories born out of policy studies may shed light on how frames affect policy 
decisions. The literature on agenda setting in the public policy process places a heavy 
emphasis on the narrative, or frame, of the public policy problem. Framing the basic 
underlining nature of the problem plays a strong role in determining the level of public 
attention and action (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993). Rochefort and Cobb (1993) break down 
the nature of a problem into five concepts: Severity, Incidence, Novelty, Proximity, and 
Crisis. Framing climate change with a narrative of its national security implications 
allows the nature of the problem to fit neatly within these concepts. If raising sea levels, 
for example, are framed as threats to military readiness the public may perceive this 
particular implication of climate change as more severe, possibly even a crisis. Aside for 
the nature of the problem itself, Rochefort and Cobb (1993) also placed emphasis on the 
nature of the solution as any potential solution must be achievable. A security frame on 
the nature of the problem may force a shift in framing the potential solutions to climate 
change’s impacts. Solutions framed to be a protection of military infrastructure may be 
viewed by the public as more achievable, thereby raising public support.   
A potential problem for environmental advocates in framing climate change as a 
severe threat is that there is no singular “villain” to assign blame. When looking to assign 
blame to problems that may seem out of government’s control, causal stories that portray 
risk, such as a national security risk, present a strong strategic advantage for policy actors 
to move issues from the accident realm to the realm of purpose, either as an intentional or 
inadvertent cause (Merry, 2014; Stone, 1989). Rather than being viewed as a force 
majeure, this shift in the causal narrative allows policy actors to tackle a public problem 
that previously seemed unachievable.  
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 Framing issues in a way that promotes the severity of the problem may raise 
public awareness, however awareness does not always lead to meaningful change. 
Specific to climate change and the environment, Downs (1972) argues that mass media 
coverage of environmental issues reinforces the cyclical patterns of the Issue Attention 
Cycle. This cycle is characterized by five stages: (1) a pre-problem stage that leads to (2) 
a period of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm when (3) the public realizes the 
cost of progress which leads to (4) a gradual decline of interest and ends in the (5) post-
problem stage where public attention has diminished, however incremental policy 
changes have been spurred (Downs, 1972). McComas and Shanahan (1999) tracked 
environmental media frames through each stage of the issue attention cycle and found 
that a narrative of consequences and danger dominated the early stages of the cycle, but 
then gave way to other frames, economic and scientific, as the environmental issues 
progressed through the attention cycle (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). However, Downs’ 
framework was published well before the media and policy actors began linking the 
threats of climate change with direct risks to national security and this strategy of 
“problem surfing” (Boscarino, 2009) may provide for greater opportunities to advocates 
of environmental policies to control the public agenda. Boscarino (2009) finds evidence 
that when advocacy groups prefer a specific solution they will attach it to different 
problems as alternative problems gain public awareness. A strategy of framing climate 
change as national security may provide advocacy groups and politicians additional sets 
of problems to attach their preferred policy action. 
 The review of the literature in this chapter lays the theoretical foundation for this 
thesis. To answer the question of whether a national security frame affects people’s 
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perception of climate change, I rely on the theories developed in the issue framing and 
media literature to build the basis for the first hypothesis this thesis seeks to test: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When presented with the treatment frame of national security, 
survey participants are more likely to agree with statements in 
support of climate change as an issue of national security. 
 
I also test the effects of a national security frame on individual’s preference for  
policy actions. Literature on policy agenda setting suggests that when issues are framed 
with severe consequences that demand public action, the public is likely to keep this issue 
in the public arena and on the policy agenda. This leads to the second hypothesis of this 
thesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: When presented with the treatment frame of national security 
survey participants will increase their level of support for specific 
policy choices. 
  
An issue frame that cannot shift perceptions and motivate the public to act has 
little use to issue messengers. However, as prior research suggests, framing an issue such 
as climate change as a matter of national security is predicted in this thesis to change 
public views of climate change and increase support of specific policy options. 
Secondary tests will be conducted to see if the impact of any framing effects on subsets 
of survey experiment participants. Before proceeding to the design and methods of this 
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study, the following chapter reports descriptive statistics on environmental public opinion 
captured in the 2016 American National Election Study. These data, along with study 
findings reviewed in this chapter provide a good indication of how certain demographics 

























 Aside from the literature on demographics of environmental advocates and critics 
reviewed in Chapter II, I also present this brief chapter that looks specifically at 
environmental public opinion along America’s political divisions. I use data from the 
American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series Study to analyze public 
opinion on environmental issues based on both political ideology and party identification. 
The first public opinion variable measured respondents’ view on whether the federal 
budget spending on the environment should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. 
The following variable measured participant’s opinion on business regulation as a 
method of protecting the environment and creating jobs. On a seven-point scale, 
respondents were asked to place themselves between 1. “Regulate business to protect the 
environment and create jobs,” and 7. “No regulations because it will not work and cost 
jobs”. In tables 3.1 through 3.4 I show the frequency and percentage for both political 
ideology and party identification on the public opinion variables. 
Throughout this chapter each table reports a highly significant chi-square statistic 
showing that there is no independence between political and environmental variables. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the public opinion frequencies among political ideology and 
party identification as it relates to federal budget spending on the environment. These 
tables present a clear indication that liberals and Democrats are far more supportive of 
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increases in environmental spending. Nearly 65% if Democrats believe federal 
environmental spending should either increase or be kept the same. This number 
increases over 99% when respondents identify as extremely liberal. Independents showed 














1,050 371 730 
40.61% 30.31% 53.83% 
2. Decrease 48 335 159 
3.32% 27.37% 11.73% 
3. Kept the 
same 
348 518 467 
24.07% 42.32% 34.44% 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 579.28, p < 0.001 
 
Opinions on environmental spending do not share nearly the same support among 
conservatives and Republicans. Nearly 70% of Republicans would prefer a decrease or 
no change in environmental spending, with over 50% of extremely conservative 
respondents believe spending should be decreased. Even those less extreme, who identify 
as slightly conservative and conservative, support decreased spending at higher rates than 
































134 413 265 521 210 141 37 
91.78% 82.27% 69.74% 58.47% 41.50% 20.17% 22.42% 
2. 
Decrease 
1 8 13 60 97 244 84 
0.68% 1.59% 3.42% 6.73% 19.17% 34.91% 50.91% 
3. Kept 
the same 
11 81 102 310 199 314 44 
7.53% 16.14% 26.84% 34.79% 39.33% 44.92% 26.67% 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 926.62, p < 0.001 
 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the frequencies on the 7-point environment-jobs tradeoff 
scale that measures respondents’ opinion on regulating businesses to protect the 
environment and create jobs. Similar to the descriptive statistics in tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
support for business regulation is divided along political and party lines. A large majority 
of Democrats are at the top one-third of the scale, with over 75% expressing support for 
regulating business to protect the environment and create jobs. Respondents who identify 
as slightly to extremely liberal are just as supportive. Less than 1% in each liberal 
category believe that there should be no regulations because they do not work and cost 
jobs. While still relatively supportive, independents are clustered more toward the middle 
of the scale, with nearly 50% in the middle one-third.  
 Again, conservatives and Republicans reported the lowest levels of support for 
business regulation. Only 10% of Republicans support regulation at the highest level, 
whereas over 40% place themselves at the bottom one-third of the scale believing 
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regulations do not work and cost jobs. By ideology, no conservative category reached 
15% for the highest level of support for regulations. Slightly to extremely conservative 
respondents each report strong majorities at bottom half of the scale.  
 
Table 3.3 













473 110 262 
38.93% 10.65% 23.17 
2. 274 97 216 
22.55% 9.39% 19.10 
3. 184 151 211 
15.14% 14.62% 18.66 
4. 175 235 228 
14.40% 22.75% 20.16 
5. 52 175 102 
4.28% 16.94% 9.02 
6. 32 165 94 
2.63% 15.97% 5.66 
7. No 
regulations 
because it will 
not work and 
cost jobs. 
25 100 48 
2.06% 9.68% 4.24 







Pearson’s Chi-Square = 1.1e+03, p < 0.001 
 
  




























112 215 104 173 65 54 21 
81.16% 45.84% 29.89% 22.58% 14.57% 8.54 14.29% 
2. 14 141 106 139 64 42 6 
10.14% 30.06% 30.46% 18.15% 14.35% 6.65 4.08% 
3. 3 68 80 137 82 72 14 
2.17% 14.50% 22.99% 17.89% 18.39% 11.39% 9.52% 
4. 5 25 39 190 111 151 24 
3.62% 5.33% 11.21% 24.80% 24.89% 23.89% 16.33% 
5. 0 11 12 63 72 120 20 
0.00% 2.35% 3.45% 8.22% 16.14% 18.99% 13.61% 
6. 3 6 4 35 33 128 36 
2.17% 1.28% 1.15% 4.57% 7.40% 20.25% 24.49% 
7. No 
regulations 
because it will 
not work and 
cost jobs. 
1 3 3 29 19 65 26 
0.72% 0.64% 0.86% 3.79% 4.26% 10.28% 17.69% 
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 This overview of public opinion relating to environmental issues provides 
supplemental demographic data to the literature reviewed in Chapter III. Through the 
ANES data, I am able to build certain assumptions on how participant’s political ideology 
may affect the survey experiment of this thesis. Tables 3.1 through 3.4 have demonstrated 
that public opinion on environmental issues, such as climate change, are dependent on 
one’s political ideology and political party affiliation. Measuring solely political 
ideology, I expect this study to find a similar lack of support among conservatives for the 
climate change and environmental variables used. However, it may be possible that the 
national security frame in this experiment may boost this support, and if so may produce 

















RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
 To answer the central research question of this thesis posed in Chapter I and to 
test the hypotheses of this thesis, an original survey experiment was designed using an 
online labor force, yielding a large N subject pool with a randomized treatment design. 
First, this chapter discusses the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (“MTURK”) and how 
crowd-sourced “workers” from MTURK were recruited as survey participants. Next, I 
discuss the design of the experiment, the national security frame, and how survey 
experiments have become an effective method throughout the social sciences. Finally, I 
describe the design and deployment of the survey experiment using the digital platform 
Qualtrics and how the survey is linked to MTURK for experiment participation. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion on the use of online labor markets for social science 
research and the merits of a digital workforce and opt-in survey participation. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk 
The survey-experiment was conducted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(“MTURK”) online crowdsourcing labor platform. MTURK recruits workers to preform 
Human Intelligence Tasks (“HITs”) set up by “Requestors” who offer a reward for the 
completion of unique tasks. Since MTURK’s launch in 2005, it has become the most 
widely used crowdsourced labor market with citations in over 15,000 published papers 
over the last 10 years (Chandler & Shapiro, 2016). This popularity is likely a result of 
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MTURK’s low cost, easy use, and requiring no interaction between researcher and 
subjects, or among fellow subjects. This lack of interaction between the researcher and 
subject may prevent any biases or interference than may corrupt the data through in-
person experiments. Furthermore, research has shown similar findings when replicating 
published, traditional experiments using only MTURK to recruit experiment participants 
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).  
The nature of MTURK as an online, opt-in labor market to gather convenience 
samples does, however, present challenges for researchers. Unless a researcher, or 
“requestor” pays premium rates for MTURK “Masters”, gathering high quality data is out 
of the control of the researcher. However, research into the demographic makeup of 
MTURK workers finds that workers have very similar demographics to traditional 
subject pools, which may provide evidence of generalizability in MTRUK experiments 
(Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). However, MTURK workers have been found to 
be less representative of the US population than internet-based panels or national 
probability samples (Berinsky et al, 2012). When researchers measure and account for 
political and demographic data, as I do in this study, MTURK has been shown to produce 
adequate data for advanced experimental research (Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016). 
Additional research suggests external validity by finding similar results when survey 
experiments are conducted on both MTRUK and through traditional methods (Berinsky 
et al, 2012; Mullinix, Leeper, & Druckman, 2015). With the rapid growth in popularity as 
a proper research tool, I am confident MTURK will provide data adequate for this study. 
MTURK organizes Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) in workers’ task queue 
based on preferences such as time, reward, and number of tasks. For this experiment, 
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workers were presented with a short description of the study, the “reward”, or payment, 
and the maximum time a worker must complete the HIT, see below: 
 
TITLE:    
“Answer a survey about your opinions on climate change.” 
 
DESCRIPTION:   
“Read a brief news excerpt and give us your opinion about climate change.” 
  
REWARD PER ASSIGNMENT  
 “$0.50” 
 
TIME ALLOTTED PER ASSIGNMENT 
“10 Minutes” 
 
The study was set up to allow exactly 800 unique workers to accept the HIT for a 
maximum of 21 days before the HIT would automatically expire.2 Additional keywords 
of “survey,” “demographics,” and “research” were provided to help Workers search for 
the HIT. MTURK offers the option to request additional qualification of Workers based 
on a series of demographics and behaviors or require that all Workers be certified as 
“Masters”, a certification that analyzes Workers performance across a wide range of 
HITs, however selecting these options increases the fee paid to Amazon. In order to keep 
this study economically feasible, no special qualifications were requested, making the 
HIT available to all Worker on the platform.3  After reading the description, Workers 
could choose to accept the HIT, which would then direct them to a link containing the 
                                                          
2 As a Requestor, I was required to prepay the entire reward per assignment ($0.50 x 800 Workers), along 
with 20% fee paid to Amazon for each unique HIT ($0.20 x 800 HITs. Due to Worker error, 15 additional 
surveys, outside of the 800 Workers requested and prepaid, were completed and recorded without the 
worker officially accepting the HIT in MTURK, therefore 15 workers were left unpaid for their 
participation.  
3 This study was awarded a graduate research grant form the University of Louisville Department of 
Political Science to cover a bulk of the MTURK expense. 
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survey-experiment. Upon completion, Workers were given a randomly generated number 
to enter into MTURK signaling the completion of the HIT.  
Framing Experiment  
The survey experiment began by asking participants to read a brief excerpt from a 
news article. From there, participants were randomly selected to receive either the control 
or treatment article. The groups received an excerpt from a real article TIME Magazine’s 
website, TIME.com, by authors Justin Worland and David Johnson from March 2016 
titled “See How Your City May Be Affected by Rising Sea Levels.” The control group 
received the first three paragraphs of the article verbatim, with no added frame. The 
original story does present a loss frame, which is evident in the excerpt received by the 
control group, however the loss is general with no mention of national security 
implications.  
For the treatment group, I first added a reference to national security directly in 
the headline. Neither the control nor treatment excerpt contained any source 
documentation, such as author or publication, as to against any unwanted effect source 
cues may present. However, Therefore, adding a framing element in the headline 
received by the treatment group may provide an additional framing effect. The excerpt 
received by the treatment group included changes in keywords in the body of the text that 
add a national security frame. Specifically, changes to the original story were made to 
terms that describe the general population and replaced with terms describing military 
installations and personnel. Both control and treatment excerpts can be found in the 
Appendix. Once participants finished reading their randomly assigned excerpt, they were 
asked to rank their agreement to a series of statements on the relationship between 
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climate change and national security, and potential policy actions. The following section 
describes the aspects of the survey instrument, the design, flow, and deployment in 
further detail. 
The use of human subjects in this experiment required approval from the 
University of Louisville Institutional Review Board.4  
Qualtrics Survey 
 The survey experiment was designed using Qualtrics online statistical software 
platform. Qualtrics survey software was launched in 2002 and allows for personalized 
survey design, external survey link that is scalable for most digital platforms, participant 
recruitment, and data analytics (Qualtrics.com). The survey was designed using a series 
of statement and/or question blocks presented individually to the participants. 
Participants had access to both “previous” and “next” page commands in the event of a 
mistake or to refer back to any point in the survey. After advancing from the first block, 
which obtained the participants consent to participate in the study, participants are asked 
to read a brief excerpt from a news article prior to advancing to the survey questions. The 
following block contained both the control and treatment news excerpt, randomized so 
that an even number of participants were distributed to groups corresponding to the 
excerpt they received. Following this randomized block, participants completed the 
survey by first responding to statements that measure both their attitude toward climate 
change as national security (“Climate-Security”) and their support for specific policy 
                                                          
4 The Chair of the University of Louisville Institutional Review Board approved this study through the 
Expedited Review Procedure since this uses a survey method of data collection, which falls under Category 
7 of 45 CFR 40,110(b). This study was also approved through 45 CFR 46.116 (C), which waives the 
requirement of a signed consent for the use of human subjects. The consent statement can be found with the 
entire survey instrument in the Appendix. 
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options (“Policy-Action”). The survey concludes with a block that captures participants 
self-reported demographic information. Once completed, a final block is presented that 
displays a disclosure statement which explains the purpose of the survey and the framing 
method used. Also included in this final block is a random and anonymous four-digit 
identifier that participants entered into MTURK in order to prove survey completion, as 
this code is only available once the participant advances to the final block and release the 
payment once the submission was approved.  
 With the survey designed in Qualtrics and linked with MTRUK, the experiment 
was launched to all U.S. based MTURK “Workers”. The following chapter, Chapter V, 
reports the demographic distribution among randomized groups, discusses the 
measurements used to test the hypotheses predicted in this thesis, and displays a series of 




DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter reports the distribution of demographics between the control and 
treatment groups and tests the hypotheses described in Chapter II. Surprisingly, within 
one hour of posting the survey link to MTURK, 815 unique Workers had completed the 
HIT, which provides further proof to the rapid expansion of online labor markets. When 
researching the validity of MTURK as a social science tool, Paolacci et al (2010) waited 
nearly three weeks to obtain roughly one thousand survey participants. Once the HIT 
reached 800 completions it was removed from MTURK and the results were recorded on 
the Qualtrics platform.  
 Once all the completed surveys were recorded in Qualtrics, the data were recoded 
to give each response a numeric value. The first level of analysis was to compare the 
distribution of the participants demographic information across both experimental groups 
by cross-tabulating each demographic by group. The Pearson’s chi-square statistics were 
calculated to test for independence between categorized variables. The first in a series of 
bar graphs, Figure 1 displays the distribution of self-identified political ideology among 







Distribution of Political Ideology between Experiment Groups. 
 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 5.59, p = 0.47 
 
Figure 1 shows only a slight variation in distribution between the randomized 
experimental groups, however, the Pearson’s Chi-Square has a p value greater than 0.05, 
which shows very little significant dependence between participation in either experiment 
group and one’s self-identified political ideology. This lack of significance in the Chi-
Square statistic shows no difference in the assignment to either experiment group based 
on a participant’s political ideology. That is, a participant identifying as “Slightly 
Conservative”, for example, had no impact on whether they fell into either the Control or 
Treatment group. Next, Figure 2 presents the distribution of Gender between the Control 
















Control 43 113 61 82 40 56 13













Distribution of Gender between Experiment Groups. 
 
  
Chi-square = 1.04, p = 0.31 
  
Again, a cross-tabulation and calculation of the Pearson’s Chi-Square on Gender 
and Experiment group shows only a slight variation among groups and a Chi-Square 
statistic well within the range to assume the variables are independent of one another. 
A p value of 0.31 is high enough to determine that there is no significant difference in 
the distribution of Gender among the Treatment and Control groups and both males 
and females had no difference in opportunity for representation in each group. 
Continuing along on demographics, Figure 3 presents the distribution of Age by 
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Distribution of Age between Experiment Groups. 
 
 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 3.07, p = 0.68 
 
The younger skew should not come as much surprise, given the very nature of online 
labor markets such as MTURK (Paolacci, et al 2010). While skewing young, the Chi-
Square statistics shows that Age played no significant determining factor in the makeup 
of the experimental groups Next, Figure 4 presents the distribution of Race among 





18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Control 37 208 91 38 22 12












Distribution of Race between Experiment Groups. 
 
 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 4.84, p = 0.44 
  
Figure 4 displays an appropriate distribution and confirms independence between 
participants’ Race and randomized experiment group and a Pearson’s Chi-Square statistic 
well within the range to reject the Chi-Square hypothesis. Race and Experiment group are 
independent of one another and the p value indicates Race had no significant bearing on 
assignment to either the Control or Treatment group. Finally, Figure 5 presents the 




















Control 254 46 11 93 0 4













Distribution of Education between Experiment Groups. 
 
 
Pearson’s Chi-Square = 0.075, p = 0.69 
 
As the demographic charts indicate, there is no statistical difference in the distribution 
of participant demographics among the control and treatment groups. Each cross-
tabulation of demographics by experiment group has a p value that far exceeds the .05 
level, which allows for the rejection of the Chi-Square hypothesis that the variables were 
dependent upon on another. While the overall survey population skews younger, more 
educated, liberal, and white, the distributions between the control and treatment groups 
did not significantly differ and these demographics played no significant role in 
determining selection into either group  
To test the hypotheses of this thesis, the survey is designed measure participants’ 
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policy actions, depending on the framing of an article the participants randomly received. 
Both areas, referred to as Climate-Security and Policy-Action, were measured within the 
same survey question block, in no particular order. Participants were asked to rank their 
level of agreement on a standard seven-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 Strongly Agree to 7 
Strongly Disagree). Both areas were measured using three questions: 
 
Climate change as national Security (“Climate-Security”): 
Statement 1: “Climate change is a direct threat to national security.” 
 Statement 2: “Rising sea-levels pose a severe risk to military readiness.” 
 
Statement 3: “Combating climate change is an effective way to improve 
national security.” 
 
Support for Policy Action (“Policy-Action”): 
Statement 1: “The U.S. Government should invest more to reverse the 
adverse effect of climate change by raising taxes on 
wealthy individuals.” 
Statement 2: “Enacting environmental policies, such as renewable 
energy programs and ‘green’ infrastructure improvements, 
should be a government priority.” 





 With an encouraging distribution of demographic data and Pearson’s Chi-Square 
showing independence among demographic variables and experiment groups, t-test 
analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter I. The null hypothesis 
of Hypothesis 1 predicts that the national security frame will make no significant 
difference on participants’ perception of climate change as national security. To reject the 
null hypothesis, a t-test must show that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean of the Control Group and the mean of the Treatment Group. T-tests 
were conducted on each Climate-Security variable individually, with a final t-test 
conducted on a Climate-Security Index generated from combining the Climate-Security 
variables. Results of this t-test are reported in Table 5.1. 
The results of Table 5.1 allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 1 and confirms, that when presented with the treatment frame of national 
security, survey participants are more likely to agree with statements in support of 
climate change as an issue of national security. Each of the three variables represent 
affirmative statements on climate change as an issue of national security. Although both 
groups were relatively supportive of the Climate-Security variables, the survey 
participants in the treatment groups received the national security frame and showed 
higher support for each of the three Climate-Security variables. Also, when indexed, the 








Results of t-test and Descriptive Statistics for Climate-Security, by Experiment Group 
 
 Climate-Security  
 Control Group  Treatment Group  
 M SD N  M SD n T 
 
Rising sea-levels 




5.19  1.53 407  5.69 1.29 407 -5.09*** 
 
Climate change is 
a direct threat to 
national security. 
  
5.06  1.67 408  5.45 1.53 406 -3.51*** 
 
Combating climate 
change is an 
effective way to 
improve national 
security.  








4.37 407  16.44 3.88 406 -4.36*** 
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
 The second hypothesis of this thesis predicted that participants given the 
treatment frame would be more likely to agree with policy options presented in the 
statements that make up the Policy-Action variable group. Just as with Hypothesis 1, a t-
test was conducted to reject that null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in 
means between the control and treatment groups. The results of this t-test are reported in 




Results of t-test and Descriptive Statistics for Policy-Action, by Experiment Group. 
 
 Policy-Action  
 Control Group  Treatment Group  




invest more to 
reverse the adverse 
effect of climate 
change by raising 
taxes on wealthy 
individuals.  










should be a 
government priority. 
  
5.65  1.48 408  5.84 1.38 405 -1.83** 
 
Policymakers should 
consider placing a 




5.36 1.69 408  5.54 1.62 406 -1.52* 
 




4.31 408  16.74 4.21 404 -2.03** 
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
 Although the treatment frame had a more significant effect on the mean support 
for climate as security tested in Hypothesis 1, the results of the Hypothesis 2 t-test are 
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significant enough to reject the null hypothesis. Survey participants were given three 
policy options and then asked for their level of support. Each Policy-Action variable has 
a mean that is significantly higher for the treatment group, who was given the national 
security frame, than for those participants in the control group without such a frame. 
There results were also confirmed when tested as an index of the variables. The Policy-
Action index shows a 0.61 difference in means between the Control and Treatments 
groups, statistically significant at p < .05. 
 With both hypotheses confirmed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, I conducted 
additional statistical models to control for the various demographic data also collected in 
the survey. Chapter II of this thesis included a review of the literature into both 
environmental and security attitudes that suggest that a security frame may have a larger 
effect on certain demographics, such as political ideology, race, and education (Konisky 
et al 2008, Severson and Coleman 2015). Table 5.3 presents the results of a t-test for the 
difference in means between the Control and Treatment groups on an index of both the 












Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by 
Experiment Group, controlled for Political Ideology. 
 
  Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index 
 Liberal    Conservative 


















































* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
Political ideology was measured in the survey on a seven-point scale ranging from 
1 – “Extremely Liberal” to 7 – “Extremely Conservative”. This variable was later 
categorized into two groups and survey participants that responded with “Moderate, 
Middle of the Road” were omitted from this t-test. The national security frame had a 
significant effect on both liberal and conservative participants on the Climate-Security 
perceptions, although this effect was not as strong for the policy options included in the 
Policy-Action Index, especially for conservatives. Unsurprisingly, liberals were more 
supportive of both the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables. These findings 
show that participants who identify as Slightly to Extremely Conservative, when 
presented with a national security frame, are motivated to associated climate change with 
issues of national security. The lack of an effect this frame had on Policy-Action among 
conservatives is even more telling of their historic disdain for environmental issues. Even 
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when presented with the national security frame, conservatives supported policy options 
at far lower rates that liberals. However, the use of the word “tax” in two of the three 
policy options may have presented an unintended frame, especially for conservatives. 
This finding may suggest that conservatives are averse to climate-mitigating policies 
when taxes are suggested.  Next, Table 5.4 reports the results of a similar t-test that 
controls for Gender. 
 
Table 5.4 
Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by 
Experiment Group, controlled for Gender. 
 
  Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index 
 Male   Female 


















































* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
  
While the security frame had little significant effect on the Policy-Action 
variables, it is significant in both Male and Female support for the Climate-Security 
variables. Moreover, these results show a high level of support for the Policy-Action 
variables when indexed. This finding supports others that show greater Female support 
for the issues surrounding climate change and the environmental overall.  The following 
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table, Table 5.5, reports the findings of a t-test that controls for Race. Figure 4 shows that 
a large majority of participant identified as White, therefore the Race variable has been 
categorized into White and Non-White. This is done not only to keep the distribution of 
these two categories comparable, but to separate the differing environmental views 




Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by 
Experiment Group, controlled for Race. 
 
  Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index 
 White    Non-White 


















































* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
 
Table 5.5 shows the national security frame had a much more significant effect on 
White survey participants than Non-White, both categories showed an increase in support 
for both variable groups when given the treatment. Overall, Non-White participants 
agreed more strongly with both the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables, a 
further signal that demographics typically aligned with the Democratic party and liberal 
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ideology express stronger support for the environment and mitigating polices. Table 5.6 
controls for Age, which has already been shown in Figure 3 to skew younger, with 60% 
of participants under 35. Therefore, Age was categorized into two groups, 18 to 34 years 




Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by 
Experiment Group, controlled for Age. 
 
  Climate-Security Index & Policy-Action Index 
 18-34   35+ 

















































* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
  
The results in Table 5.6 shows a stronger support among younger participants for 
both variable groups, as well as a more significant difference in means when those 18 to 
34 years old were presented with the treatment frame.  The national security frame had no 
significant effect on support for the Policy-Action variables for participants 35 years of 
age or older. The final t-test in this series controls for education, which prior research 




Overall, the results of the t-tests presented in Tables 1 through 7 strongly suggests 
that the treatment which framed climate change as an issue of national security had a 
significant effect on survey participant’s perception of climate change and support for 
climate-mitigating policy action. The hypotheses tested in this chapter provide some 
explanation to the central research question of this thesis. This chapter concludes by 
presenting the results of OLS regression model that reports a coefficient for each control 
variable. This multivariate model offers a bit more explanation in the variance of support 
for the Climate-Security and Policy-Action variables by controlling for the variables that 
office competing explanations for this variance.  
Table 5.8 reports these regression findings and shows that group assignment, that 
is whether a participant received the original news excerpt or the security framed 
treatment, had a positive relationship in determining support for the Climate-Security 
variables. Aside from the data reported in Table 5.1, Table 5.8 also affirms Hypothesis 1. 
Receiving the treatment frame is associated with a 1.21-point increase in agreement with 
the Climate-Security statements. The treatment frame also had a strong significant effect 
on the Policy-Action Index. Random selection into the treatment group is associated with 
a 0.54 increase for support for the policy options listed in the Policy-Action index. This 
finding is consistent with the bivariate results shown in Table 5.2, supporting the 
hypothesis that exposure to a nation security frame will increase levels of support for 







Results of t-tests and Descriptive Statistics Climate-Security and Policy-Action, by 
Experiment Group, controlled for Education. 
 
 
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed 
 
 
As suspected, Political Ideology also played a large role in support, or lack 
thereof, for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action, independent of group selection. As 
participants moved in ideology from the liberal to conservative category, Climate-
Security saw a 0.89 reduction in agreement to the statements. Furthermore, as the t-test in 
Table 5.3 which controlled for Political Ideology showed, participants who identified as 
Slightly to Extremely Conservative reported little support for policy actions and shifting 
from left to right along the political spectrum is associated with a 1.21 reduction in 
support for policies. While these findings are assumed through a review of the literature 
into environmental polarization along political lines, significant reductions in support for 
policy actions, even when conservative participants are exposed to the national security 
frame, demonstrates just how large this divide remains. 
 High School  Bachelors 















































































The regression model in Table 5.8 shows Gender with no statistically significant 
coefficient for either the Climate-Security or Policy-Action index. Although, as survey 
participants moved from Male to Female there is an associated increase in agreement 
with the statements of the study, Gender alone was not a significant factor in this 
increase. This finding suggests that women, in general, may be more receptive to climate-
mitigating policies, regardless of how the issue is framed. It is possible that this finding is 
a result of women identifying more as a liberal (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap & McCright, 
2000, 2011), making political ideology the leading factor for their increase in policy 
support. 
Table 5.8 reports that Age had a significantly negative relationship with both 
Climate-Security and Policy-Action as the age of the participant increased. Agreement on 
the Climate-Security statements decreased by 0.38 as age increased. Similarly, agreement 
among the policy options in the Policy-Action index decreased by 0.48. There are likely 













Results of OLS Regression Model on Support for Climate-Security and Policy-Action by 
Control Variables. 






Policy-Action Index  





 -0.89*** (0.08)  
 
 -1.22*** (0.07)   
Gender  0.17 (0.27)  
  0.29 (0.27)   
 
Age  -0.48*** (0.12)  
 
 -0.38*** (.11)   
Race  1.27*** (0.28)  
  0.75** (0.28)   
Education 
 0.41** (0.21)  
 
 0.00 (0.20)   
Group 
 1.21*** (0.26)  
 
 0.54** (0.26)   
Constant  18.50 (0.85)  
  20.84 (0.79)   
 
Adj R2  0.22  
 
 0.28   
** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .001. N = 807 
 
Climate-Security and Policy-Action, but the primary difference, as with Gender, 
may be in their political ideology. As political parties are becoming more divided among 
age, the more liberal young population may be more reliable supporters of traditional 
Democratic Party issues. Younger participants will likely have to endure the more severe 
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effects of climate change for many years to come, which may also be a contributing 
factor in their support. 
Survey participants who self-identified as Non-White also reported a statistically 
significant increase in support for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action. Similar to 
Age and Gender, political ideology does seem to be a factor on Race, as being a Non-
White participant in this study was associated with an increase of 1.27 and 0.75 in 
support for Climate-Security and Policy-Action, respectively. As Whites are more 
aligned with conservative ideology and the Republican Party (Abramowitz, 1980; Dunlap 
& McCright, 2000, 2011) their decreases in support to the statements in this study over 
Non-Whites is not surprising. However, the finding in Table 5.5 may suggest that 
receiving the national security frame may be the primary cause of any increased support 
among White participants.  
Finally, participants’ level of education had a significant positive regression 
coefficient for the Climate-Security Index while having also no relationship to the Policy-
Action Index. As the level of participant education increased, their support for the 
Climate-Security statements increased by 0.41. Education may be best summarized by 
the results in Table 5.7, showing not only insignificant difference in means between the 
control and treatment groups along Policy-Action, but an actual slight decrease in policy 
support when receiving the national security frame.  As a participant’s level of education 
increased, the security frame had no significant effect on the support for policy options, 
although it should be noted that participants with higher levels of education responded 
more supportively overall of the Policy-Action statements.                
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 The findings in Chapter V presented positive results from a large-N sample of 
online respondents to the central research question and hypotheses this thesis seeks out to 
test. Aside from the typical demographic skews that are expected in online labor markets, 
the distribution of demographics between the Control and Treatment groups proved 
adequate for comparison and a Chi-Square analysis confirmed independence among the 
variables. In nearly each T-test conducted, even when controlling for demographic 
variables, subjects receiving the national security frame showed a strong and significant 
increase in support for both Climate-Security and Policy-Action statements. In the 
conclusion of this thesis, Chapter VI discusses these findings in greater depth, the ways 
this study may impact framing studies, and how the rapid changes in communications and 




















DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The issues surrounding climate change continue to have a polarizing effect on 
many Americans. In this thesis I offer a potential bridge to this divide with a 
comprehensive study on how issue frames can shape public opinion, even on divisive 
issues. This division also lead me to the central research question presented in the 
Introduction: “Will the public perceive issues of climate change differently when they are 
framed as threats to national security?”  To answer that question, this thesis employs an 
experimental survey method to measure the impact that security framing has on 
participant’s perception of both climate change and environmental policy options. In this 
final chapter, I discuss the findings presented in Chapter V, offer suggestions on the 
direction of future research into environment-as-security given the findings of this thesis, 
and speculate about how the expansion of social media may present obstacles to issue 
framing.   
 For a national security frame to be successful in altering perceptions on climate 
change, the public must first be convinced that issues typically associated with climate 
change, rising sea levels in this case, are in fact matters of national security. To test the 
first hypothesis, statements that directly tie climate change to national security were 
given to survey participants asked to rank their level of agreement.  Strong statistical 
evidence presented in Chapter V confirms this hypothesis that when presented with the 
treatment frame of national security, survey participants are more likely to agree with 
statements in support of climate change as an issue of national security. The statistical 
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analysis reported in Table 5.1, shows an increased in support for the Climate-Security 
statements when participants received the national security news excerpt. Even when 
controlling for most demographic variables, the increase among treatment group 
participants held steady.   
The data and analysis reported in Chapter V tells a very clear story on the current 
state of polarization in climate change perceptions. On average, participants self-
identifying as liberal perceive climate change as a matter of national security at a rate that 
far exceeds Conservatives. The demographic groups that are typically associated with 
these political ideologies present similar results. Young, non-white, and higher educated 
respondents all support the Climate-Security statements at greater levels than other 
groups. However, as the regression model in Table 5.8 shows, Political Ideology had the 
highest negative association with Climate-Policy support. The finding begs the questions 
as to what, if any, frame can be applied to climate change that would get Conservatives to 
change their perceptions on this issue.  
Along with testing the effects of a national security frame on the public 
perceptions of climate change, I also sought out to test if such a frame would affect 
participants’ support for particular climate mitigating policy options. After all, aside from 
an issue frame changing public perceptions, an additional goal of issue framers should be 
to foster action in support of their policy goals. Viewing climate change as a threat to 
national security alone will not satisfy this goal. Frames should also change perceptions 
of what should be done about the issue. To measure this support, participants ranked their 
level of agreement to three policy options. I find, that when presented with the national 
security frame, participants will increase their level of support for specific policy choices. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, participants across both experiment groups were overall 
relatively supportive of the Policy-Action variables, although this support was higher 
among those who received the treatment frame, as hypothesized.  
As with Hypothesis 1, increases in support for policy options was associated with 
more than just exposure to the treatment frame. Agreement with the Policy-Action 
statements can be viewed in a similar light was Climate-Security. Liberals, and related 
demographics such as young people, racial minorities, and those with higher levels of 
education showed higher support of policies, regardless of the frame the participant 
received. However, Conservatives may be been at an unintended disadvantage in support 
for the Policy-Action statements. Conservatives have historically been unmatched in their 
anti-tax attitudes (Abramowitz, 1980) and two of the three Policy-Action statements 
suggested imposing or raising taxes. With strongly significant findings that a national 
security frame increases perceptions that climate change is a matter of national security, 
future studies may look at additional policy areas to measure support. Rather than 
“Carbon-Tax” policy, conservatives may respond more supportive of a “Carbon-Offset” 
or “Tax Incentive” policy. These alternative policies to a “Carbon-Tax” could be applied 
to either individuals or corporations and by providing an incentive as opposed to a 
punishment, such alternatives may find some conservative support.  
By confirming the hypotheses this thesis set out to test, framing climate change as 
national security may be a useful tool for media outlets, politicians, and advocacy groups 
to use to garner support in areas that traditionally shy away from such perceptions and 
policies. The review of media literature in Chapter II provides adequate evidence that 
sensational stories increase public attention and provide outlets with more incentive to 
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run such stories. It may be hard to find a more sensational media story than one with 
national security as the focal point. This is not to say that policy messengers should adopt 
media strategies that stoke fear and anxiety in the public realm, and this thesis is not an 
endorsement of such a strategy. However, if the effects of climate change do not 
currently warrant such a dramatic frame, many indications suggest that they soon will as 
storms increase in intensity, drought and famine result in mass migrations, and military 
installations are affected by rising seas.  
The use of a national security frame in discussing the effects of climate change 
may be most beneficial for politicians and issue advocacy groups. Liberals running for 
public office in conservative districts can beef up their national security bone fides 
without compromising traditional liberal stewardship for the environment. Groups 
advocating for environmental causes such as land use or renewable energy may be able to 
broaden their pool of supporters by embracing a national security frame, especially in 
areas with a heavy military presence which is typically along America’s coasts. 
 Of course, for a media strategy that frames climate change as an issue of national 
security to reach the public at large and change perceptions on climate issues, these 
particular frames must find a receptive audience in an overcrowded media landscape. The 
vast expansion of media choice available to consumers has not had the effect on 
knowledge of political and policy issues some might expect. Regardless of this massive 
increase in media choice over the past few decades, political knowledge has remained 
constant over the same period of time (Prior, 2005). Rather than the evening news being 
the only program available to watch at a given time, hence providing all views with a 
singular issue frame, people are now able to selectively expose themselves to consume 
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only the media messaging they prefer and frames that reinforce their ideological leanings. 
Conversely, this media environment also allows consumers to avoid everything else that 
strays away from their policy and policy comfort zone. Research into the public’s media 
preferences does not bode well for producers of policy messages. When given the option 
to choose, only 5% of people prefer the news over other forms of programming, such as 
entertainment, while 34% rank the news at or near the bottom of their preference (Prior, 
2005). This preference for entertainment over information should leave little doubt over 
the lack of growth in American’s political knowledge and ability for some to respond to 
framing effects.  
 However, recent research does suggest that increased knowledge of policy issues 
can be seen in some segments of the public. The high-choice media environment has 
shown to increase political knowledge in those that are already knowledgeable but 
decreases among those with little knowledge to begin with, thus widening knowledge gap 
(Prior, 2005). This decrease among those who already lack knowledge may present one 
of the largest challenges to political actors attempting to control their preferred issue 
frame as they may be more susceptible to a frame that incites fear and uncertainty than 
those who are more in tune to the political environment.  
Another factor leading to the increased knowledge gap of political issues as a 
result of the high-choice environment is the near elimination of passive learning through 
accidental exposure. When people are exposed to political information, even when 
accidental, they are able to retain some level of knowledge without having any interest in 
the topic (Prior, 2005). When the evening news was the only program on, viewers’ only 
option was to watch or turn off the television, but when they do tune in knowledge can be 
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gained. This is no longer the case with hundreds of channels, dozens of social media 
platforms, and thousands of websites competing for viewers by offering them the frames 
and issues that speak best to the consumer. 
Even when people do seek out news and information over other, more popular, 
choices such as entertainment, they are often likely to do so through an ideological lens. 
As this thesis shows, perception of climate as security and support for climate change 
mitigating policies is determined as much by political ideology as the issue frame used in 
the experiment. When given the choice of news that either confirms or disagrees with 
their point of view, 43% of Americans prefer the source that reaffirms their ideological 
views, while only 24% of people actively seek out opposing viewpoints (Gainous & 
Wagner, 2014). This phenomenon of selective exposure, as well as selective avoidance, 
sorts individuals and groups into information bubbles and echo-chambers, where only the 
information that confirms one’s beliefs is consumed. These newly formed information 
bubbles and message echo chambers present possibly the greatest problems to issue 
framers moving forward, as some media consumers selectively expose themselves only to 
particular frames, likely presented through a political lens.  
 Although issue framers, media outlets, and the like may be at an increasing 
disadvantage in proliferating their preferred frame, this thesis makes it clear that issue 
frames are still an effective tool messengers can use to change public perception and 
foster support for particular policy goals. The survey experiment deployed and the 
confirmation of the hypotheses of this thesis suggests a national security frame may be a 
stronger tool than other frames when defining the effects of climate change. It is no 
stretch of the imagination that issues relating to climate change are issues of national 
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security. After all, for a time in the recent past, this frame was the official position at the 
highest levels of government. It may take the widespread proliferation of this frame, as 
well as an ability to penetrate the information bubbles that are hindering public 
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Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will Be Affected 
 
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave 
cities on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the 
warnings, though, Americans continue to live and build in regions likely to be 
inundated with water in a matter of decades. 
 
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as 
many as 13 million people may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S. coasts by 
2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many people as 
would be affected in the absence of continued coastal development and 
anticipated population growth along the sea. 
 
“By their nature populations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer, 
a demographer at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted 
infrastructure to protect people vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a 
migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the 









Treatment Excerpt: National Security Frame 
 
Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will be Affected, Threatening National Security 
 
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave 
military instillations on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent 
flooding. Despite the warnings, though, America’s military continues to build and 
operate in regions likely to be inundated with water in a matter of decades. 
 
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as 
many as 13 million people, many of them active-duty service members and their 
families scattered across nearly 130 coastal military bases, may live in vulnerable 
regions along the U.S. coasts by 2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s 
three times as many military personnel as would be affected in the absence of 
continued coastal development and anticipated population growth along the sea. 
 
“By their nature military operations are always changing,” says study author Matt 
Hauer, a researcher at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted 
infrastructure to protect the military personnel and equipment vulnerable to sea 
level rise, we could see a migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period 
in the U.S. during the 20th century when millions of Americans moved to cities in 
the North.” The effects of such an event may pose an irreversible threat to 














Start of Block: Default Question Block 
Dear Participant: 
 
 You are being invited to participate in a research study by answering questions in the 
attached survey about your attitudes toward climate change. This study is conducted by 
researchers from the University of Louisville. There are no known risks for your 
participation in this research study. The information collected may not benefit you 
directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The information 
you provide will contribute to our understanding of climate change attitudes. Your 
completed survey will be stored at the University of Louisville, Department of Political 
Science. The survey will take approximately 10 minutes time to complete. You will be 
credited $0.50 on your MTurk account 2-3 days following completion of the task. 
 
 Individuals from the Department of Political Science, the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), the Human Subjects Protection Program Office (HSPPO), and other regulatory 
agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will be held in 
confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your identity 
will not be disclosed. 
 
 Taking part in this study is voluntary. By answering survey questions, you agree to take 
part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you 
uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study, 
you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop 
taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify. 
 
 If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please 
contact: Dr. Jason Gainous at 502-852-1660 or jason.gainous@louisville.edu. If you have 
any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Human Subjects 
Protection Program Office at (502) 852-5188. You can discuss any questions about your 
rights as a research subject, in private, with a member of the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). You may also call this number if you have other questions about the research, and 
you cannot reach the research staff, or want to talk to someone else. The IRB is an 
independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the 
institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. 
The IRB has reviewed this research study. 
 
 If you have concerns or complaints about the research or research staff and you do not 
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wish to give your name, you may call 1-877-852-1167. This is a 24-hour hot line 
answered by people who do not work at the University of Louisville. 
End of Block: Default Question Block 
 
Start of Block: Block 5 
Please read the following brief news excerpt before proceeding the survey questions. 
End of Block: Block 5 
 
Start of Block: Block 2 
*Questions in this block were randomized to present only one of the elements below. 
These elements were evenly presented to participants. 
 
Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will Be Affected 
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave cities on 
U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the warnings, 
though, Americans continue to live and build in regions likely to be inundated with water 
in a matter of decades. 
 
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as many as 
13 million people may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S. coasts by 2100 if sea 
levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many people as would be affected in 
the absence of continued coastal development and anticipated population growth along 
the sea. 
 
“By their nature populations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer, a 
demographer at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted infrastructure to 
protect people vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a migration that mirrors the Great 
Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the 20th century when millions of Americans 




Millions Along U.S. Coasts Will be Affected, Threatening National Security 
 
Study after study has shown that sea-level rise due to climate change will leave military 
installations on U.S. coasts vulnerable to severe and more frequent flooding. Despite the 
warnings, though, America’s military continues to build and operate in regions likely to 
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be inundated with water in a matter of decades. 
 
New research published in the journal Nature Climate Change suggests that as many as 
13 million people, many of them active-duty service members and their families scattered 
across nearly 130 coastal military bases, may live in vulnerable regions along the U.S. 
coasts by 2100 if sea levels rise by 5.9 feet (1.8 m). That’s three times as many military 
personnel as would be affected in the absence of continued coastal development and 
anticipated population growth along the sea. 
 
“By their nature military operations are always changing,” says study author Matt Hauer, 
a researcher at the University of Georgia. “If we don’t have adapted infrastructure to 
protect the military personnel and equipment vulnerable to sea level rise, we could see a 
migration that mirrors the Great Migration”—the period in the U.S. during the 20th 
century when millions of Americans moved to cities in the North.” The effects of such an 
event may pose an irreversible threat to military readiness and national security.    
End of Block: Block 2 
 
Start of Block: Block 3 
 





Rising sea-levels pose a severe risk to military readiness.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Somewhat agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Somewhat disagree   
o Disagree   






The U.S. government should invest more to reverse the adverse effects of climate change by raising taxes 
on wealthy individuals.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree    
o Somewhat agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Somewhat disagree    
o Disagree   




Climate change is a direct threat to U.S. national security. 
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Somewhat agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Somewhat disagree   
o Disagree   






Enacting environmental policies, such as renewable energy programs and “green” infrastructure 
improvements, should be a government priority.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree    
o Somewhat agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Somewhat disagree   
o Disagree   




Combating climate change is an effective way to improve national security.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Somewhat agree  
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Somewhat disagree   
o Disagree   






Policy makers should consider placing a “carbon tax” on carbon-emitting industries.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Somewhat agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Somewhat disagree   
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
End of Block: Block 3 
 
Start of Block: Block 4 
 





o Extremely Liberal   
o Liberal   
o Slightly Liberal   
o Moderate, Middle of Road   
o Slightly Conservative   
o Conservative    







o Male   





o 18-24   
o 25-34    
o 35-44    
o 45-54   
o 55-64    





o White   
o Black or African American   
o American Indian or Alaska Native    
o Asian   
o Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander   






Highest Level of Education 
o High school graduate, diploma, or the equivalent   
o Bachelors degree   
o Masters degree or higher   
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